



REGIONAL OR PAROCHIAL? SUPPORT FOR CROSS-COMMUNITY SHARING WITHIN CITY-REGIONS

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ABSTRACT: *This article explores whether citizens of city-regions hold a particular attitude about collective action. We model individual support for the new regionalist idea that communities sharing the same city-region (i.e., metropolitan area) should share resources across them to solve regional problems. Using data from a random sample survey of adults living in 15 metropolitan areas in the state of Georgia in the United States, we use Bayesian analysis to determine the effects of a set of individual and contextual factors on the attitude. Conventional political cleavages of race, gender, and place of residence produce the strongest effects. We offer a set of theoretical, methodological, and practical implications for future research on political orientations of citizens in city-regions.*

City-regions, the sets of municipalities and unincorporated areas that territorially share a common spatial and commercial region (Ache, 2000; Herrschel, 2014; Scott, 1998, 2001a), are where most people live (Sellers & Walks, 2013). Beyond constituting a vital scale for the global economy by serving as valued spaces for economic competition and cooperation, as well as economic growth and governance (Parr, 2005; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008; Scott, 2001b), city-regions are important levels for designing institutions and other forms of collective action for effective governance of collective problems spanning proximate municipalities and their environs (e.g., Deas & Giordano, 2003; Rodriguez-Pose, 2008). Scholarship on the city-region as a concept and scale for cooperation, however, is nearly myopic in its “focus upon the dynamics of the interrelationships between institutions, coalitions of policy actors, and policy initiatives,” particularly in terms of political economy (Deas & Giordano, 2003, p. 225). This is true too of much of the new regionalist literature.

While scholars continue to explore attitudes and behaviors at lower scales of cities and neighborhoods, for instance, the urban affairs literature practically ignores the attitudes and behaviors of citizens of city-regions. It especially overlooks the attitudes and behaviors that shape what democracy does and could be in city-regions, despite the fact that the scale of the city-region produces political effects, influencing, in particular, electoral behavior (see, e.g., Sellers, Kübler, Walks, & Walter-Rogg, 2013), and potentially more radical democratic behavior by and through social movements (Purcell, 2007).

It is curious that urban scholars rarely empirically attend to the actual sentiments and preferences of the residents of city-regions. First, many institutions proposed for city-regions such as supramunicipal ones like regional legislatures for improving representation, broadening civic engagement, expanding voting rights, and aggregating regional preferences (e.g., Frug, 2002) will thrive or be stillborn, succeed or fail, according to how citizens of city-regions answer “questions of value and of judgment, of what we should and should not do, and of how much” in a city-region (Wood, 1958, p. 119). Second, serious efforts to resolve many issues, ranging from equitable development to economic interdependence and competitiveness to environmental sustainability require citizens sharing the

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same city-region to think differently about their obligations to and behaviors towards one another (Bollens, 2003; Downs, 1973, 1994; Frug, 2002; Heinelt & Kübler, 2005; Norris, 2001; Orfield, 1998; Swanstrom, 1996; Weir, 2000;). Third, better balancing of the political influences of class, race, and space and fostering greater equality of opportunities and outcomes in city-regions require advocacy coalitions and campaigns encouraging and mobilizing feelings and sentiments of regional regard, affinity, community, and citizenship (Orfield, 1998; Pastor, Benner, & Matsuoka, 2009; Pavel & Anthony, 2009; Weir, 2000; Weir, Holman, & Swanstrom, 2005).

What and how do people in city-regions think, especially about new regionalist ideas/ideals, especially those cohering with cross-community sharing of resources within city-regions? What factors influence the attitudes citizens may hold in city-regions that could support or weaken initiatives and institutions for regional government and governance? Drawing from the emergent scholarship on political attitudes and behavior in European city-regions (e.g., Kübler, forthcoming; Lidström, 2010, 2013; Sellers et al., 2013; Vallbé, Magre, & Tomàs, 2015) and the U.S.-based literature on new regionalism (e.g., Downs, 1973; Orfield, 1998; Steinacker, 2004; Swanstrom, 1996), we focus on the concept and possession of a particular political orientation in city-regions—the “regional perspective” (Downs, 1994, p. 183). The regional perspective values *intraregional* cooperation among citizens and communities. Its strongest form includes collecting and redistributing resources, especially tax revenues, within city-regions to solve problems burdening the metropolis as a whole but often affecting particular places in them (Dreier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2001; Orfield, 1997; Weir, 2000; Weir et al., 2005). Although it is only one perspective among multiple political orientations present in the mind of the body politic of city-regions, we aver that it is the one most related to and consequential for city-regions. Functioning as an “impulse” for collective action in city-regions (Foster, 1997, p. 377), the regional perspective influences the adoption and diffusion of new regionalist policy proposals in and across city-regions.

To explore the possession of the regional perspective in city-regions, we rely on data from a random sample survey of adults living in fifteen metropolitan areas in the state of Georgia, United States. While data from a small sample of metropolitan areas in a single state poses challenges for analysis and generalizability, the data from Georgia permit direct tests of our research question. Employing Bayesian inference techniques for multivariate analysis, we model individual support for the particular idea that citizens sharing city-regions should engage in cross-community sharing of economic resources within their city-regions. That idea, we contend, captures well the concept of the regional perspective.

Our Bayesian models include individual-level and contextual factors we deduced from the literature that should influence the possession and strength of the regional perspective in the minds of respondents. Contrary to expectations, individual-level factors, generally, outweigh community-level factors regarding the breadth and strength of support for the regional perspective. In particular, conventional political cleavages of race, gender, and class produce the strongest and most consistent effects. Still, certain contextual factors are influential, namely place of residence, public-collective modes of consumption, and the presence of metropolitan institutions. We conclude with theoretical, methodological, and practical implications from the study, including suggestions for future research on political orientations of citizens in city-regions.

THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE AS A POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF CITIZENS OF CITY-REGIONS

Most scholars define citizenship in a city-region in broad terms. At a minimum, such citizenship is *jus soli*—citizenship by residence (Frug, 2002). The degree to which it includes a bundle of rights, duties, and obligations of membership in a political community, linked to legal recognition by some authority, is less important (for our purposes) than a perception that residence by itself gives one political standing and regard in a political community.¹ Additionally, given the arguments of Purcell (2003, p. 566) that citizenship has been altered under globalism and the rise of city-regions—“rescaled,” “reterritorialized,” and “reoriented”—from the national to the subnational and from the

local to the regional, residents of city-regions may perceive themselves as citizens at that scale, but not to the exclusion of other scales, and to differing degrees, shaped by a variety of factors.

A common trait of city-regions is that their citizens are mobile. Theoretically, this is consequential for attitudes and behaviors. Residences, employment, and places of leisure/culture tend to be spatially separate, even if the home spaces of citizens are in particular places. The trifurcation of the core activities of life may influence how people in city-regions think, especially the scale at which they do it (e.g., neighborhood vs. metropolis), the degrees of attachments they feel to a particular scale (see, e.g., Kübler, forthcoming; Vallbé et al., 2015), and what they think governments in their city-regions should do to sustain or improve the quality of life. The trifurcation also may foster metropolitan-level affinity and “spatially expanded attachment” (Lowery, Hoogland DeHoog, & Lyons, 1992, p. 84). Such affinity and attachment could foster a general sense of membership in the city-region, a regional identity with it, and a regional consciousness (Lidström, 2013; Paasi, 2003), whereby citizens perceive of and situate themselves in a broader polis, namely the metropolitan or regional community (Kelleher & Lowery, 2008, p. 67).² Affinity and attachment to the city-region may provide them with a wide scope for looking at their city-region and seeing across its particular communities and how they constitute a whole.

A wide metropolitan scope may influence and sustain resident interest in issues and possibly concern for matters related to the entire city-region and help them make connections among problems in particular communities to actions (or the lack thereof) at the city-region level. A wide metropolitan scope also may shape interest in issues and concern for matters in multiple (or at least two) municipalities or communities in a city-region—the municipality or community of the citizen and a municipality or community apart from it but in the same city-region (Lidström, 2010, 2013). Furthermore, a wide metropolitan scope could be value-neutral, avoiding a normative stance towards political matters (e.g., interest in regional problems without taking a position on proposed policy alternatives) or value-informed, taking normative positions on political questions (e.g., interest in regional problems with favor towards a particular solution or set of policies).

Perhaps because of or separate from seeing themselves as sharing space and everyday experiences in a city-region, some residents have an understanding that they share (or should share) obligations for sustaining or improving their city-region, inclusive of assisting all quarters of it, not just its *favored quarter* (Cashin, 2000). They may believe or recognize that problems (and solutions) in their city-regions are metropolitan ones, shared across a city-region and deserving of collective action at the scale of it (i.e., intraregional and cross-community cooperation).

Alternatively, the spatial trifurcation of home, work, and leisure in city-regions and the mobility resulting from it may have deleterious effects on attitudes and behaviors of the residents of city-regions. Instead of affinity and attachment, travel within city-regions and across municipal and community borders may foster aversion and detachment among some citizens. Furthermore, given enduring patterns of class and racial segregation in U.S. city-regions, it is plausible that spatial trifurcation does not yield much diversity of spatial experiences in the daily rounds of city-region residents. Thus, they would possess greater affinity and attachment for the environs of their home space, perceiving themselves as primarily attached to their immediate communities, not the metropolis. Consequently, they may have a narrow scope of metropolitan interest and concern.

Along with their spatially compressed affinity and attachment to their particular community instead of the city-region, residents may express strong parochial interests (Lowery et al., 1992, p. 81). Such interests may grow from cross-community travels within a city-region, which facilitate familiarity with other quarters of the metropolis but result in contempt for them, as the proverb goes. They also may stem from prejudice and other sources of intergroup conflict that map onto and transform space (e.g., racial resentment or social encroachment). Consequently, some residents of the metropolis may disregard appeals for support from and for communities where they do not reside, even if they share the same city-region. This group of citizens may express their disregard through defensive localism—the denial or veto of transfers of resources from one community to reduce problems or promote welfare in another community within the same city-region (Danielson, 1976; Orfield, 1998; Weir, 1996).




FIGURE 1
Resident Orientations in City-Regions: Regional vs. Parochial

To clarify the distinction between those possessing the regional perspective and those possessing the parochial perspective, imagine two dimensions (Figure 1). The first dimension is the scope of metropolitan focus and/or concern (x-axis). Again, this is the degree to which a resident may perceive of and have interest in their city-region as a metropolitan community or polis. The second dimension is the level of tolerance for cross-community sharing of resources within the city-region (y-axis). The intersection of the two dimensions creates four types of residents in a city-region. Figure 1 illustrates the typology of resident orientations, distinguishing the regional from the parochial.

The upper right quadrant contains citizens of city-regions with a metropolitan-wide focus/concern regarding their city-region and a high tolerance for redistribution of collective resources within a city-region and across communities in it. (Instead of tolerance for redistribution, we could presume other dimensions that cohere with intraregional cooperation such as city-county consolidation or intergovernmental cooperative agreements.) Thus, citizens with the strongest regional perspective perceive the metropolis as a level of community and support individuals (or institutions) behaving in accordance with the position that citizens sharing a city-region should share resources across communities in it to solve collective problems that are metropolitanwide or consequential for the progress of the metropolis.

In contrast, the lower left quadrant contains those citizens in city-regions that possess the inverse of the regional perspective—the parochial perspective. They have a narrow scope and interest in their city-region as a polis and a low tolerance for redistribution of collective resources within their city-region, even if such transfers would improve the overall conditions of the city-region. It is among this group of citizens in city-regions that defensive localism resides and arises. Their localism commonly manifests as sentiments and decisions that undermine intraregional cooperation among municipalities and unincorporated communities in the same city-region. In particular, defensive localism prevents purposive redistribution of resources from one community to another community within the same metropolitan area (Barron & Frug, 2005; Danielson, 1976; Orfield, 1998; Weir, 1996).

As for the remaining quadrants, they contain the range of residents whose orientations fall between the regional perspective and the parochial perspective. This group includes (lower right quadrant) residents who perceive and acknowledge their inclusion in a metropolis but who are less willing to

support collective action through redistribution of resources across communities in the city-region. While they are inclined toward hoarding their resources from other communities in their city-regions, perhaps influenced by factors such as race, class, and place, they do not lack attachment to and interest in their city-regions. They may love their city-region for its use and exchange values without believing they are obligated to invest beyond their particular communities to improve the overall quality of their city-regions. The remainder also includes, as the upper left quadrant implies, residents with a narrow scope of interest and concern for the city-region but who nonetheless have high tolerance for resource redistribution across communities in the city-region. Beyond liberal ideologies, *moral intuitions* (Lewis, 2015) and/or religious traditions and affiliations (Owens, 2010) that inform and guide individual-level preferences for spending, consumption, and a variety of policy issues may influence their attitudes towards cross-community sharing.

What factors influence possession of the regional perspective as a political orientation? Which factors may strengthen the regional perspective among citizens of city-regions, reducing the parochial perspective? Public opinion research suggests that multiple individual-level factors, particularly race, gender, and class, influence political opinions and policy preferences, particularly in relation to the choice to share resources with people and places deemed different in some way (e.g., Gilens, 1995). Additionally, where people live shapes their political attitudes and guides their behavior (e.g., Huckfeldt, 1986; Huckfeldt, Plutzer, & Sprague, 1993), which is true of the attitudes and behaviors of residents of metropolitan areas (Gainsborough, 2001; Walks, 2004a, 2004b). Accordingly, turning our attention to the values and preferences of metropolitan residents, we should expect both individual and contextual effects to shape the political orientations of the citizenry of city-regions. Specifically, as we hypothesize below, there is a set of individual and contextual differences among citizens of city-regions that should influence attitudes and behaviors resonant with the regional perspective.

Regarding individual factors, we should expect race to have a significant influence on the breadth and strength of the regional perspective at the individual level. Due to enduring racial segregation, racial minorities, relative to Whites, generally occupy less affluent quarters of city-regions in the United States, which often have lower quality amenities and higher rates of disorder (Massey & Denton, 1998; Shapiro, 2005). Because racial minorities tend to reside in areas that would benefit from the institutionalization of the regional perspective, we hypothesize that *racial minorities will have a broader and stronger regional perspective than Whites*. Additionally, gender should affect the presence and strength of the regional perspective of citizens of city-regions. Generally, men are less likely than women, at least in the United States, to support collaboration and sharing to reduce collective action problems, particularly by governments and paid for by taxpayers (Alozie & McNamara, 2010; Owens, 2010; Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001). Plus, gendered expectations and relationships in city-regions may shape local citizenship in myriad ways that allow for women and men to hold vastly different opinions on public questions (Garber & Turner, 1995). We predict that *men will have a narrower and weaker regional perspective than women*.

Furthermore, socioeconomic class often creates deep and sustained divisions in the political attitudes of individuals (Feldman, 1988). Consequently, we expect class to influence support for the regional perspective. As the class status of individuals increases, the breadth and strength of the regional perspective should decrease. Specifically, given what scholars know about the greater likelihood of upper income individuals to hoard their resources (Alozie & McNamara, 2010; Bobo, 1991; Gainsborough, 2001; Steinacker, 2001, 2004), we predict that *as the income of individuals increases the regional perspective narrows and weakens among them*. Relatedly, we predict that *homeowners will have a narrower and weaker regional perspective than renters*. Our prediction accords with the tendency of homeowners to disfavor greater local taxation and to behave in defensively local ways to protect their property values, to reduce their property tax burdens, and to invest more in maintaining higher quality local amenities and places of privilege-making such as schools (Barreto, Marks, & Woods, 2007; Fischel, 2001).

Also, longer residence may strengthen attachment to the city-region, which may increase concern for the metropolitan area, inclusive of collective problems within it (Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Vallbé et al., 2015). Therefore, we predict that the length of residence in a city-region will affect support for the regional perspective among citizens of city-regions: *The longer one has resided in a*

city-region the broader and stronger their regional perspective will be relative to citizens with shorter residences. Finally, if Lidström (2013) is correct, the greater the frequency of intermunicipal visits by individuals the broader and stronger the regional perspective will be for city-region citizens.

Concerning contextual factors, suburban residence should influence where citizens of city-regions fall on the parochial–regional perspective continuum. Generally, suburbanites in the United States deliberately separate themselves from the heterogeneity and disquiet of cities (Lassiter, 2006; Sennett 1970a, 1970b). They also seek to preserve their economic and political autonomy from the city (Abbott, 1981; Kirp, Dwyer, & Rosenthal, 1997). They wish to remain “largely free from the need to adjust their interests to those of other local jurisdictions and residents in the metropolis” (Danielson, 1976, p. 39). Accordingly, suburbanites tend to favor excluding nonsuburbanites and suburbanites they deem different from them from using their resources (Danielson, 1976; Lassiter, 2006; Weir, 1996). Therefore, *suburbanites will have a narrower and weaker regional perspective than residents of cities.*

The presence of metropolitan or regional institutions, however, should be consequential for public attitudes and behaviors of citizens of city-regions. Lowery et al. (1992, p. 94; see also Frug, 2002; Kelleher & Lowery, 2004) suggest that psychological attachments to communities by residents of consolidated municipal governments, for instance, are stronger than those of residents of fragmented municipal governments. Metropolitan institutions of government/governance and lower degrees of municipal fragmentation in a city-region may influence the awareness of and understanding for shared governance by citizens. In the presence of services provided by institutions above the level of individual municipalities but below the level of states, residents may perceive of themselves first as metropolitan or regional citizens, or at least they may perceive themselves to hold simultaneous citizenships in neighborhoods, municipalities, and city-regions (Frug, 2002). We hypothesize that *individuals residing in communities that have deliberately reduced municipal fragmentation will have a broader and stronger regional perspective than residents of other communities.*³

Given the traditional racial conflicts over the redistribution of collective resources, as well as racial differences in socioeconomic and spatial opportunities and outcomes, the racial context of city-regions should influence the breadth and strength of the regional perspective at the individual level. In particular, we predict that *citizens from communities with higher proportions of Blacks will exhibit broader and stronger regional perspectives.* Also, following the individual-level prediction regarding income, we predict that *residents of more affluent communities will report narrower and weaker regional perspectives than residents of less affluent communities.* Furthermore, we reason that *consumption cleavages—private-individualized versus public-collectives modes of consumption (e.g., automobile use versus use of public transit)—will influence the regional perspective among citizens of city-regions, with modes of consumption reflecting intersecting dimensions of social class, ideology, and government intervention (Dunleavy, 1979, p. 420).* Our prediction is that *individuals in communities with higher degrees of public-collective modes of consumption will have broader and stronger regional perspectives than those in communities with lower degrees of public-collective modes of consumption.* Finally, political partisanship in a city-region should influence possession of the regional perspective. *Citizens of communities with greater electoral support for the Democratic Party will express a broader and stronger regional perspective than citizens from communities with greater electoral support for the Republican Party.*

RESEARCH DESIGN

Applying the city-region concept to space in the United States is not a straightforward endeavor. Scholars disagree over the operationalization and measurement of the concept, given that in many countries the boundaries of city-regions are informal or inferred. Central to the measurement debate over city-regions is how to bound city-regions (i.e., how to know when you are in one), how much, if any, of the exurbs and rural parts should we include, and how to determine the status and equivalence of multiple cities, especially municipal satellites of central cities, in a city-region (Parr, 2005; Scott, 2001a). While leaving unresolved how to define and demarcate the spatial limits of city-regions for study and analysis, Rodriguez-Pose (2008, p. 1027) provides one of the clearest elaborations of

the concept: “The minimum common denominator of virtually all definitions of a city-region is the presence of a core city linked by functional ties to a hinterland. The nature of those ties varies from one definition to another, but generally includes a combination of economic, housing market, travel-to-work, marketing, or retail catchment factors.” In accordance with that definition of city-regions and for the purposes of our study, we equate metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) with city-regions.

Furthermore, scholars studying political attitudes and behaviors of citizens in city-regions, regardless of the country, face a challenge—acquiring survey data. Unfortunately, publicly available opinion surveys with national samples for the United States or other nations, as well as valid and reliable measures, exclude questions pertaining to the political orientations of citizens in city-regions, inclusive of attitudinal and behavioral components of political orientations (e.g., attitudes and behaviors such as interest in regional issues, the sharing of tax revenues between communities within the same city-region, and degrees of intermunicipal political activism). We overcome this hurdle by drawing on data from the biennial Georgia Poll.

Between April 29, 2008, and June 12, 2008, the Georgia Survey Research Center at the University of Georgia conducted a random-digit dial survey of a probability sample of 549 adults from across the 15 MSAs of the state. Its sampling error was $\pm 4.2\%$, with a 95% confidence interval and a 32% response rate. We rely on data from 420 respondents that resided in nonrural portions of Georgia’s MSAs (Figure 2).⁴

While recognizing the limits of a single-state study and how Georgia is imperfect for some kinds of political studies, along with the fact that our analysis is exploratory, Georgia offers some advantages. First, the set of MSAs in the state constitutes a diverse mix of social, economic, and political contexts. Second, Georgia is a hot spot for a particular new regionalist idea—consolidation of municipal governments and county governments.⁵ Third, racial dynamics strongly affect political choices and social outcomes in the state’s MSAs (e.g., Lassiter, 2006), mirroring political trenches and patterns of group conflicts elsewhere in the United States. Finally, Georgia permits tax referendums at the scale of city-regions, which invite (and may induce) citizens of city-regions in Georgia to identify where they stand—residentially, attitudinally and behaviorally—*vis-à-vis* the political orientation of the regional perspective (Owens, 2014).

Dependent Variables

Attitudes about public transit, environmental regulation, or social welfare provision, among other policy questions solvable at the city-region scale, help to identify and clarify how citizens may think and act in relation to their city-region. While such attitudes do not constitute the entire set of topics for gauging political orientations within city-regions, they do contribute to an understanding of where—and why—individuals may possess the regional perspective.

We use a set of three measures tapping support for intraregional sharing of resources among communities within a MSA. Each measure may be understood as identifying individual-level positions on cross-community sharing, with each position falling on a theoretical spread of views on intraregional redistribution of collective tax revenue in a city-region. The spread ranges from general support for transferring tax revenue from one community to another in the same city-region for general purposes associated with the regional perspective to specific support for targeted purposes associated with the regional perspective. Higher values on each measure represent a stronger regional perspective; lowers values accord with a stronger parochial perspective.

The first variable—the *regionalism index*—measures general support for metropolitan cooperation and cross-community sharing of financial resources in a city-region. Survey respondents were asked: “Do you think that the suburban, city, and county governments in your area should *share* their financial resources and work with each other (1) to protect and preserve the natural environment such as air, water, and green space, (2) to develop and implement a regional plan to reduce traffic congestion and suburban sprawl, and (3) to expand access to good jobs and better housing for low-income families living in cities and in suburbs?” Posed as three separate questions, respondents were instructed to answer *yes* or *no* for each issue area. Responses were summed to create a regional perspective index. The index measures the breadth of the regional perspective among respondents. Scores ranged from




FIGURE 2
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Georgia, 2008

0 to 3, where the highest value (score of 3) equals the broadest regional perspective at the individual level and the lowest value (score of 0) corresponds with an absence of the regional perspective.

The second variable—*intra-regional traffic tax*—measures strength of support for the redistribution of financial resources from one community to another community in the same city-region to resolve a collective problem. Respondents were asked to express the strength of their approval or disapproval of their local elected officials voting for legislation that would allow local governments in their area to increase taxes to pay for regional programs to reduce traffic congestion and suburban sprawl in (a) their own communities and (b) in the communities of others.

The specific questions were posed in the following order. (1) “Your local elected officials may vote for legislation that would allow suburban, city, and county governments in your area to charge an additional one-penny sales tax to pay for regional programs to reduce traffic congestion and suburban sprawl in *your community*. Would you say you strongly approve, approve, not sure, disapprove, or strongly disapprove?” and (2) “Your local elected officials may vote for legislation that would allow suburban, city, and county governments in your area to charge an additional one-penny sales tax to pay for regional programs to reduce traffic congestion and suburban sprawl in communities *other*

than your community. Would you say you strongly approve, approve, not sure, disapprove, or strongly disapprove?" We restrict our attention to responses to a regional tax to reduce traffic and sprawl in communities other than those of the respondents but in their city-regions. This allows us to gauge the strength of support for a form of cross-community sharing of resources that is perhaps least likely to create conflict but is commonly proposed for city-regions by scholars arguing for greater incorporation of regionalist ideas into political institutions (Bollens, 2003; Downs, 1994; Dreier et al., 2001; Orfield, 1997; Weir, 2000).

The third variable—*intraregional low-income tax*—is the strength of support for another form of cross-community sharing of tax revenue, which also requires greater sharing of space for social equity purposes. It is support for intraregional sharing of tax revenue to assist low-income families. It is a policy prescription that metropolitanists strongly favor (Bollens, 2003; Cashin, 2000; Dreier et al., 2001). But it also is one that historically has generated deep social conflict within city-regions of the United States (Kirp et al., 1997). Specifically, it is a stance most likely to foster defensive localism, decisions by a community to prevent the use of their resources by another community, even within the same city-region (Bollens, 2003; Weir, 2000).

Respondents were asked to express the strength of their approval or disapproval of their local elected officials voting for legislation that would allow local governments in their area to increase taxes to pay for regional programs to expand access to good jobs and better housing for low-income families in (a) their own communities and (b) in the communities of others. The specific questions were posed in the following order. (1) "Your local elected officials may vote for legislation that would allow suburban, city, and county governments in your area to charge an additional one-penny sales tax to pay for regional programs to expand access to good jobs and better housing for low-income families *in your community*. Would you say you strongly approve, approve, not sure, disapprove, or strongly disapprove?" and (2) "Your local elected officials may vote for legislation that would allow suburban, city, and county governments in your area to charge an additional one-penny sales tax to pay for regional programs to expand access to good jobs and better housing for low-income families *in communities other than your community*. Would you say you strongly approve, approve, not sure, disapprove, or strongly disapprove?" Approval of a tax for helping low-income families in communities other than our own in a city-region is a direct measure of the degree to which we support increased taxation for cross-community spending and it permits a stringent test of support for perhaps the most contentious proposal by U.S. new regionalists.

Independent Variables

Individual

Most of our individual-level independent variables take the form of dummy variables: race, self-reported (1 = *non-Whites*, 0 = *Whites*), whereby non-Whites include Blacks, Latinos, and Asians; gender (1 = *female*, 0 = *male*); housing tenure (1 = *homeowner*, 0 = *renter*); and income, \$0–\$24,999 (1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*), \$25,000–\$49,999 (1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*), and \$50,000–\$74,999 (1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*), with \$75,000 or more being the reference category. We include measures (self-reports) of the number of times respondents visit other municipalities in their MSA, along with the length of time respondents have lived in their city-regions. This set of measures comes from the Georgia Poll. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables in our models.

Contextual

We include a dichotomous measure for place of residence (1 = *suburb*, 0 = *city*), self-reported by respondents to the Georgia Poll. We also include two measures of metropolitan institutionalism—residence in a consolidated city-county government within a city-region (1 = *yes*, 0 = *no*) and the number of municipalities per capita in the MSA. Also, relying on data from the 2000 Census and the 2008–2012 American Community Survey, we include measures of the proportions of Blacks, median household incomes, and percentage of employed residents in a county that use public transit

TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics

Dichotomous Variables				Continuous Variables					
Name	No	Yes	NA	Name	Median	SD	Min	Max	
Suburb	246	174	0	Municipal fragmentation	2.21	3.95	0.54	43.83	
Non-White	288	119	13	Population density (10,000s)	0.38	0.75	0.02	2.46	
Female	139	280	1	Proportion Black	0.19	0.18	0	0.6	
Homeowner	68	339	13	Household income (\$100,000s)	0.47	0.1	0.28	0.71	
Income: \$0–\$24,999	250	47	123	Proportion public transit commute	0.01	0.03	0	0.09	
Income: \$25,000–\$49,999	239	58	123	Proportion voting democrat, 2006	0.32	0.15	0.13	0.68	
Income: \$50,000–\$74,999	228	69	123						
Reside: 1–5 Years	309	110	1						
Reside: 5+ Years	146	273	1						
Visit other cities: Daily	318	101	1						
Visit other cities: Weekly	353	66	1						
Visit other cities: Monthly	370	49	1						
Consolidated city-county	395	25	0						

to reach their jobs (i.e., public-collective consumption) in the counties of respondents. We include a measure of partisanship (i.e., the percentage of votes at the county-level cast for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate in the 2006 election), using data from the Georgia Secretary of State. We also include population densities of the counties of respondents.⁶

METHODS

Our data set includes dependent variables that tightly cohere to our concept of the regional perspective. However, our sample is small, which hinders our ability to detect patterns within the data. Eliminating observations with any missing data would reduce our sample by an additional 30%. Also, while our dependent variables and some of our independent variables are measured at the individual level, many of our independent variables are measured at the county level and invariant across individuals within the same county. Including fixed effects to account for the multilevel structure of the data—with respondents grouped within counties within MSAs and variables measured at different levels—would further decrease degrees of freedom. Plus, some counties in our data have many respondents; others have far fewer. Within a fixed effects framework, where the underlying assumption is that the fixed effects are independent of one another, the variation in the number of respondents per county introduces the danger of drawing wildly incorrect conclusions, if respondents within a county are not a representative sample of its residents.

Bayesian analysis, however, provides more precise estimates when data sets are small and independent variables are collinear (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Western & Jackman, 1994). Accordingly, we estimate coefficients using Bayesian multilevel models, treating our dependent variables as functions of the individual-level variables and a county-level random effect that accounts for the influence living in a particular county has on its residents.⁷ Bayesian multilevel models permit us to incorporate information that is not explicitly in the data. In particular, Bayesian analysis allows us to link geographically proximate counties (i.e., counties that likely share unmeasured characteristics with their neighboring counties) in our models, despite our exclusion of MSA-level data. We estimate coefficients for each independent variable, random effects at the county-level and MSA-level,⁸ and cut points common to ordered logit models, employing the dummy variables for income categories, number of years living within the city, and frequency of visiting other cities to detect nonlinearities. Our online methods appendix provides more description of our approach (<http://www.janelawrencessummer.com/technical-appendix.html>).

TABLE 2

Determinants of Support for the Regional Perspective

	Model 1 Regionalism Index	Model 2 Intraregional Traffic Tax	Model 3 Intraregional Low-Income Tax
<i>Individual-level factors</i>			
Non-White	0.674** (0.03, 0.91)	0.584** (0.14, 0.74)	0.791** (0.31, 0.94)
Female	1.123** (0.62, 1.31)	0.623** (0.23, 0.75)	0.668** (0.26, 0.81)
Homeowner	-1.2* (-2.27, -0.85)	-0.36^ (-0.9, -0.17)	-0.894** (-1.48, -0.69)
Income (\$0-\$24,999)	0.385 (-59.55, 21.36)	0.252 (-61.52, 20.83)	-0.284 (-63.67, 22.36)
Income (\$25,000-\$49,999)	-0.004 (-0.81, 0.28)	-0.687** (-1.25, -0.49)	-0.291^ (-0.91, -0.08)
Income (\$50,000-\$74,999)	-0.423^ (-1.13, -0.18)	0.091 (-0.43, 0.27)	0.102 (-0.42, 0.29)
Length of residence, 1-5 years (Reference: < 1 year)	0.689 (-0.52, 1.08)	-0.317^ (-1.04, -0.07)	-0.876* (-1.68, -0.62)
Length of residence, 5 years or more	0.52 (-0.61, 0.9)	0.002 (-0.71, 0.25)	-0.868* (-1.65, -0.6)
Visits other municipalities: Daily (Reference: < Twice a month)	0.525 (-0.16, 0.76)	0.115 (-0.41, 0.28)	0.126 (-0.38, 0.3)
Visits other municipalities: Weekly	0.087 (-0.7, 0.36)	0.2 (-0.36, 0.39)	-0.12 (-0.68, 0.08)
Visits Other Municipalities: Once or twice a month	0.316 (-0.54, 0.62)	0.39 (-0.22, 0.6)	0.678* (0.05, 0.9)
<i>Contextual-Level Factors</i>			
Resides in a suburb	0.085 (-0.53, 0.29)	-0.49* (-0.94, -0.33)	-0.559** (-1.02, -0.4)
Resides in consolidated city-county jurisdiction	1.21 (-0.77, 1.9)	-0.825^ (-2.09, -0.39)	0.51 (-0.85, 0.99)
Municipal fragmentation score (authors' calculation)	-0.013 (-0.08, 0.01)	0.008 (-0.04, 0.02)	-0.005 (-0.06, 0.01)
Population per square mile (in 1,000 people), 2008	-0.565^ (-1.6, -0.22)	0.232 (-0.48, 0.48)	-0.418^ (-1.21, -0.15)
Proportion Black, 2008	-1.976 (-7.93, 0.14)	2.707 (-1.05, 3.98)	0.053 (-4.17, 1.42)
Median household income (in \$100,000s), 2008	4.094 (-1.77, 6.18)	-0.684 (-4.64, 0.73)	2.702 (-1.99, 4.38)
Proportion workers commuting by public transit, 2008	4.599 (-14.74, 11.68)	-15.483* (-30.85, -10.51)	-4.86 (-21.78, 0.37)
Proportion vote for Democratic gubernatorial candidate, 2006	4.063 (-2.88, 6.57)	-2.494^ (-7.29, -0.82)	1.485 (-4.1, 3.29)

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$. ^ designates "significant" estimates by posterior distribution, if not t -statistic.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results of our multivariate analyses. All coefficients are the means of the posterior distributions of the coefficients. The 95% credible intervals are in parentheses below the coefficients. We substantively interpret the coefficients the way we would interpret any coefficient and confidence interval in an econometric analysis. It is easier and more appropriate, however, to assess the results by looking at the credible intervals, which are the 2.5% and 97.5% bounds of the posterior distributions (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2009).⁹ Unlike looking at a mean and standard deviation, there is no assumption of a normally distributed posterior distribution. Rather than tell us if the coefficient is roughly two standard deviations away from zero, the credible interval tells us whether most of the distribution overlaps zero or not, along with the direction of the effect. If

the credible interval does not overlap zero, it means that 95% of the estimates produced by the model during the simulations are in the same direction as the coefficient (whether negative or positive). With a high degree of certainty, we can infer that the effect is in a particular direction, even if the coefficient is not a set number of standard deviations from zero (i.e., statistically significant). All estimates we are nearly certain are significant, even if they fail to be some number of standard deviations from zero, we identify with a caret (^), signifying significance based on the posterior distribution.¹⁰

In Model 1 the regional index is the dependent variable. A majority of respondents (62%) fall into the third and highest category on the regional index, with 16% in the second category, 5.7% in the first category, and 2.6% in the lowest category. With respondents not separating much into the categories, identifying the characteristics behind their choices is difficult. The results of Model 1, therefore, may be less telling than the other models. Nevertheless, as predicted, we find strong evidence that gender and race influence possession of the regional perspective, as measured by our index of support for intraregional sharing of financial resources. Specifically, women and non-Whites are more likely than men and Whites to possess the regional perspective. Homeownership, however, relative to renting, tends to produce more parochial views. That finding accords with theory. We also find that respondents earning between \$50,000 and \$75,000 hold more parochial views than those earning over \$75,000. Yet the results are inconclusive for the two other income categories. Furthermore, only one contextual variable is significant: Respondents from MSAs with higher population densities are statistically more likely to hold the broader regional perspective than respondents from MSAs with lower population densities.

Model 2 explains the willingness of respondents to support an intraregional tax to generate revenue to address traffic congestion outside of their particular community but in another part of their metropolitan area. Pegged to a 5-point scale, higher values indicate greater support for the hypothetical tax. Unlike the results of Model 1, the results of Model 2 show greater variation in support by respondents—7% express strong agreement, 13.5% express strong disagreement, and the three intermediate (i.e., moderate) categories garnering between 20% and 30% agreement. Supporting our hypotheses, the results of Model 2 further suggest that women and non-Whites are more likely than men and Whites to express higher degrees of approval for an intraregional tax as an expression of the regional perspective. The results also support our hypothesis that homeowners are less likely to approve of such a manifestation of the regional perspective. Also, those reporting incomes of \$25,000–50,000 are more likely to disapprove of the tax than those reporting incomes of \$75,000 or more. As for length of residence, respondents who have lived in their city-regions for 1–5 years are more likely to disapprove of the intraregional tax than those who have lived there for less than a year.

Regarding the contextual factors, we continue to find a suburban effect. Suburbanites relative to urban dwellers are more likely to express disapproval for the proposed intraregional tax for decreasing traffic congestion in communities other than their own. Plus, respondents from communities with higher rates of public-collective consumption (i.e., a greater percentage of residents relying on public transportation) are unlikely to approve of an intraregional tax for traffic decongestion. This may make sense given that users of public transit may already see their choice to commute via mass transit as the better solution to the problem, compared with common decongestion efforts such as road widening. The results also suggest, countering expectations, that respondents from areas with consolidated city-county governments are less supportive of an intraregional tax where revenues would benefit communities other than those of the respondents. If correct, regionalist institutions may have unintended effects on public attitudes that may constrain public support for some types of intraregional cooperation.

Additionally, respondents from areas with larger percentages of voters favoring Democrats are less likely to support an intraregional tax for traffic reduction than respondents from areas favoring Republicans, at least at the gubernatorial level. This may reflect the influence of environmentalism among Democrats. Perhaps respondents interpreted the question to imply more investment in roads over mass transit, which is a common partisan divide in Georgia (Owens, 2014). Although the coefficient for partisanship is much smaller than the coefficient for the public-collective consumption measure, scaling both measures by the standard deviation of their empirical distribution reveals how close they are to each (−0.45 and −0.36, respectively).

The results of Model 3 are similar to those of the other models. Women and non-Whites show greater support for the regional perspective, measured by support for an intraregional tax to expand access to good jobs and better housing for low-income families. Suburban residence and homeownership predict more parochial views towards the intraregional tax. Income yields a consistent and clear, albeit weaker, effect: Respondents with incomes between \$25,000 and \$50,000 are more likely than those with incomes of \$75,000 or more to support the intraregional tax to assist low-income families. This indicates that middle-income respondents are systematically different in their orientations towards the regional perspective than the most affluent, as well as the upper-middle-class and even the poorest respondents. This makes sense. The poorest stand to gain from the tax while the wealthier may not feel too burdened by the tax. In contrast, those in the middle are neither beneficiaries nor unburdened by the tax and its redistribution.

Like Model 2, the results of Model 3 suggest that respondents residing in their city-regions for 1–5 years are more likely than newcomers to oppose the intraregional tax to assist low-income families in communities elsewhere in their MSAs. We also see that those who have lived in their city-region for five or more years are equally likely to oppose the intraregional tax, relative to those who have lived in their city-region for less than a year. This suggests that length of residence may strengthen affinity and attachment to immediate communities without strengthening regional attachment or directing one's orientation towards the regional perspective, which counters expectations. Furthermore, we see that greater frequencies of visits to other municipalities in the MSA—daily or weekly—seem to have neither a positive nor negative effect, relative to those who seldom travel, on the regional perspective of respondents, measured by support for the intraregional tax to better opportunities for low-income families. Instead, those who report that they visit other cities monthly or bimonthly are more likely to approve of tax policies that benefit others outside their community but within the same metropolitan area, relative to those who travel to other cities less frequently. Finally, population density appears to influence support for the intraregional tax to assist low-income families, as it did for the regionalism index (Model 1). Specifically, respondents from areas with more people per square mile, on average, are more disapproving of an intraregional tax that would benefit communities other than their own in the same metropolitan area.

Predicted probabilities allow for better interpretation of our results from the three models. Many of our variables of interest, however, are dichotomous. Consequently, the standard practice of varying one variable at a time while holding other variables at their means or medians does not yield substantively meaningful interpretations. Instead, we present predicted probabilities using bar plots (Figure 3). The plots illustrate a few realistic and substantively meaningful scenarios. We encourage readers wanting to plot other predicted probabilities and generate alternative scenarios to use the on-line bar plot tool we created to supplement our analyses (<https://jlsommer.shinyapps.io/owenssummer>).

The plots show that among suburban female homeowners the effect of race is pronounced. The predicted probability distributions for Whites and non-Whites regarding approval/disapproval for the intraregional traffic tax are nearly mirror images. Specifically, Whites are as likely to disapprove of the tax as non-Whites are to approve of it. Concerning the intraregional tax to assist low-income families, Whites are almost as likely to disagree as they are to agree, and are far more likely to strongly disagree when compared to non-Whites. Non-Whites are by far most likely to approve of this tax. This reminds us of the importance of attributes such as gender and race. While homeownership and suburban residence are choices, and choices that predict less favorability for the intraregional taxes, being female and non-White can trump the influence of those choices when it comes to opinion and preference formation. While demographics are not destiny, the lived experiences associated with membership in or identification with marginalized groups can be more important than life choices. The same story emerges when analyzing White male renters. Although the suburb–city divide is statistically significant across the three models, it is substantively weaker for White male renters. Both suburban and nonsuburban White males are most likely to disagree with the intraregional traffic tax and agree to the intraregional low-income tax. Although suburbanites express more opposition to the intraregional traffic tax and nonsuburbanites are more favorable to the intraregional tax to assist low-income families, the results of the suburb–city divide are less meaningful than results associated with gender, race, and homeownership.




FIGURE 3

Predicted Probability Boxplots

Among White males in cities, the effect of homeownership is noticeable but weak for the intraregional traffic tax, but pronounced for the intraregional tax to assist low-income families. Whereas renters are about equally likely to agree, disagree, or be neutral on the traffic tax, homeowners are very likely to disagree or strongly disagree. Renters are far more likely than homeowners to support the tax assisting low-income families. Roughly twice as many renters as homeowners report strongly agreeing with the tax. There is an approximately 15% gap between renters and homeowners among those that agree, with renters being more favorable. Similarly, homeowners are about twice as likely as renters to strongly disagree with this tax.

Taken together, the three models identify mixed effects of individual and contextual factors on the breadth and strength of the regional perspective in the city-regions of Georgia. Gender, race, homeownership, and suburban residence yield the most consistent and strongest effects in terms of statistical significance. In combination with one another, however, there appears to be evidence that, substantively, *who you are* matters more than *what you do*. Gender and race have very strong effects that appear to offset the oppositional effects associated with choices like where to live and whether to buy. There is some evidence, too, albeit weaker, that particular contextual variables related to the metropolitan institutions and public-collective consumption influence aspects of the regional perspective.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Generally, the study of city-regions favors issues of economic competitiveness and institutional design over citizenship and attitudes and behavior by individuals. Joining others in advancing the nascent study of political attitudes and behavior in city-regions, our research elaborated and operationalized one possible and important political orientation of citizens in city-regions—the regional perspective. Like new regionalists, we contend that the regional perspective is fundamental for improving the quality of life and democracy in city-regions (Downs, 1994; Purcell, 2007). Furthermore, its importance stems from its potential to “help foster the kind of regional thinking needed to address metropolitan problems” (Frug & Barron, 2013, p. 225), as well as influence the adoption of metropolitan mechanisms for problem solving. Conversely, the adoption of such mechanisms could influence the spatially and politically extended attachments of residents in city-regions.

In our empirical examination of the regional perspective, we posited that a set of individual and contextual factors would influence the possession of it. Contrary to expectations, a small set of individual factors significantly trumped the contextual factors in their effects on the breadth and strength of support for the regional perspective. In particular, conventional U.S. political cleavages of race, gender, homeownership, and place of residence yielded the strongest effects. Surprisingly, given theory and extant research, the contextual factors beyond place of residence generally failed to influence attitudes related to the regional perspective. That alone is evidence, for instance, that we may need to rethink how regionalist institutions may produce not only unintended effects but have no effect on the political attitudes and behavior of citizens in city-regions.

Our results suggest that race, gender, homeownership, and place of residence may be most consequential for collective action at the scale of city-regions, be it *intraregional* cooperation or some other endeavor. This suggests, at a minimum, for instance, that campaigns for intraregional, cross-community sharing of resources need to increase the participation of women, non-Whites and renters, while further developing messages for reducing and responding to the defensive localism of suburbanites (Owens, 2010, 2014; Pastor et al., 2009). Also, the strong gender cleavage we predicted and observed should spur scholars to revisit and extend research on gender, place, and citizenship, particularly at the scale of the city-region (Staeheli & Clarke, 1995; see also Garber & Turner, 1995).

Our findings are meaningful in light of a fundamental question—whether the political orientations of citizens in city-regions vary among types and categories of people and places. Findings from our study of the regional perspective provide partial evidence that orientations can vary between citizens sharing the same city-region. For instance, place of residence consistently and strongly influences the breadth and strength of the regional perspective held by residents of the MSAs in Georgia. Specifically, we demonstrate that suburbanites are less likely than residents of cities to support intraregional taxes for collective action in communities other than their own in their city-regions.

Although our data are useful for operationalizing the regional perspective, theorizing its breadth and strength, and exploring its determinants, our findings warrant caution. They are from a modest sample of citizens of city-regions in one state. A useful step forward would be to replicate the survey we relied on and administer it in other MSAs in the United States, especially outside of the South. This is particularly necessary given that our findings failed to support our full set of hypotheses, especially those related to contextual effects, even if some of the results suggest rejecting the null hypotheses. Moreover, our data are insufficient for answering equally important alternative research questions

about the variety of political orientations of citizens in city-regions. How and why do citizens think and behave politically at the scale of the city-region, and what explains the variation in their attitudes and behaviors as regional citizens?¹¹ What is the substantive significance of the political orientations of citizens in city-regions? What difference may they make for designing democratic institutions for that scale and evaluating their outcomes regarding the development of regional identities and the choices citizens make? Furthermore, to what degree do political orientations differ across city-regions? Are some political orientations more prevalent in particular city-regions?

Given the limits of correlational analysis and data from one of 50 states, our findings invite more rigorous investigations of the prevalence of the regional perspective and other political orientations in city-regions in and beyond the United States. The limitations of our study also invite scholars to consider alternative causal mechanisms of the regional perspective and other political orientations of citizens of city-regions. Future studies, drawing on surveys of greater numbers of respondents, which are increasingly common among European scholars studying citizenship in city-regions (e.g., Kübler, forthcoming; Vallbé et al., 2015), along with rigorous case studies, should clarify how some political orientations develop and shift. They also may assist scholars in better understanding why some political orientations gain more traction and have more influence than other political orientations. This would help scholars better understand, for example, how particular coalitions of citizens in city-regions can improve democratic governance and foster greater regional equity (Orfield, 1997; Pastor et al., 2009; Pavel & Anthony, 2009; Purcell, 2007; Weir et al., 2005).

ENDNOTES

- 1 It is undetermined how many political orientations citizens of city-regions may possess. We posit that it will depend on the types and multiplicity of issues in city-regions. However, we leave it to another time to identify political orientations that shape the support and opposition for other issues in city-regions (e.g., growth management, environmental sustainability, and siting of nuisance facilities such as wastewater treatment plants). Thus, our study is a partial consideration of political orientations in city-regions.
- 2 Regional or metropolitan identification could be weak, developed from “shared symbols of metropolitan pride” such as sports teams (Lowery et al., 1992, p. 97). Under the right circumstances (e.g., the presence of institutions for regional participation such as regional legislatures), however, their identity may be a building block for a regional citizenship, one that “would not replace local citizenship but ‘complement’ it [as] one more item in the complex bundle of identities that people assume for themselves” (Frug, 2002, p. 1827).
- 3 The causal arrow (or the direction of the correlation) may run in the opposite direction, whereby the dominance of the regional perspective or the parochial perspective is highly correlated with and may influence the presence or absence of metropolitan and regional institutions in city-regions.
- 4 In 2008, the fifteen MSAs (and the number of survey respondents from them) in Georgia included Albany (8); Athens-Clarke County (4); Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta (262); Augusta-Richmond County (35); Brunswick (6); Chattanooga (14); Columbus (8); Dalton (9); Gainesville (9); Hinesville-Fort Stewart (2); Macon (14); Rome (10); Savannah (19); Valdosta (9); and Warner Robins (11).
- 5 Georgia has had more city-county consolidations than any other state in the United States (Fleischman, 2000). Since 1933 more than three dozen city-county consolidation referendums have occurred in Georgia. The most recent referendum passed in 2012. Also, Georgia is located in the region where 54% of the 39 city-county consolidations in the United States have been adopted (Martin & Hock Schiff, 2011, p. 168).
- 6 In other models (not shown), we included the log of the population of the county of respondents. Its effect was neither significant nor substantive.
- 7 Our approach permits random effects to emerge from a common normal distribution, allowing for “shrinkage”—observations at the extremes are drawn closer to the mean (Clark & Linzer, 2015). Because the random effects framework estimates only a mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution, we rescue substantial degrees of freedom for our models.
- 8 Random effects estimate a mean and standard deviation of a distribution from which the random effects are drawn, rather than a coefficient for each unit. In our case, this means we estimate four parameters (county mean,

county standard deviation, MSA mean, and MSA standard deviation) instead of coefficients for each county and MSA.

- 9 Confidence intervals and credible intervals can be intuitively interpreted in the same way. Technically, they are different. A confidence interval is calculated by calculating the range 1.96 standard deviations away from the coefficient in either direction. Bayesian analysis uses a Markov chain Monte Carlo estimation method, where iterations of the estimation process produce a set of estimates. This set of estimates forms the posterior distribution of each parameter. The mean of that distribution becomes the coefficient estimate. The 95% credible interval is the space in which 95% of those estimates lie.
- 10 An estimate where 95% of the estimates fall to one side of zero but does not pass the typical significance test of being approximately 1.96 standard deviations from zero probably does not have a normal posterior distribution. In other words, if you were to plot the simulated estimates for any parameter, it would not look like a normal curve. Standard tests of statistical significance assume a normal distribution.
- 11 Even in the MSAs of Georgia, for instance, there is a difference between attitudes and behaviors related to the regional perspective. For instance, even though most citizens of city-regions in Georgia held high a regional perspective at the time of the 2008 survey, four years later voters in the majority of the state's city-regions voted against regional one-penny tax increases for transportation and transit projects to reduce traffic congestion (Owens, 2014).

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